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 The corporation income tax occupies a tenuous place in the economics of 
taxation.  The purpose of this paper is to offer an economics perspective on the issue of 
corporate tax reporting behavior, and to focus on what economics can contribute to the 
policy debate about corporate tax noncompliance.  The policy and practice of corporate 
tax avoidance and evasion are ahead of economic theory and empirical analysis.  Our 
empirical understanding of corporate behavior depends mostly on two sources of data, 
(publicly-available) financial statements and (confidential, but characterized in 
aggregated form) tax returns.  There is a set of empirical questions on which we can 
make progress, such as the interaction between sheltering and real decisions, the cross-
sectional determinants of corporate evasion and the use of abusive tax shelters, and how 
accounting rules and enforcement affect tax reporting and real decisions.  There are 
subtle policy questions, such as the impact of public disclosure of corporate tax return 
information, linking tax liability to financial statement income, and the impact of 
penalties on corporate directors and abusive tax shelter promoters, to which clear 






















The corporation income tax occupies a tenuous place in the economics of 
taxation.  The theory of taxation stresses the importance of looking through the corporate 
entity and tracing the incidence of the tax to the shareholders, workers, and customers.  In  
a comprehensive income tax, there is no reason to tax the income generated by 
corporations any differently than any other source of income, and justifications have 
centered on its role as a backstop or withholding device for an imperfect personal income 
tax.  The sharp decline in the relative size of federal corporation income tax revenues 
since the 1950’s, from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1951 to less than 1.5 percent of GDP in the 
last few years, has been welcomed by some as a benign development.  Indeed, part of the 
decline has been due to a process of “do-it-yourself integration,” as a growing fraction of 
businesses operate as pass-through entities such as S corporations and limited liability 
companies, and as indebtedness increases. 
Many recent events suggest that the time is ripe for a rethinking of how we tax 
corporations.  By setting a maximum personal tax rate of 15 percent on dividends, the 
2003 tax act featured the most fundamental change since World War II in the taxation of 
corporate-source income and took a significant step in the general direction of integrating 
the corporate and personal income tax systems. This change in the tax law happened 
amidst much controversy regarding abusive avoidance and evasion among corporations, 
the political fallout of which may partly explain why the integration came in the form of 
tax reductions in the personal tax rather than the corporate tax.  The Enron scandals, 
although focused on improper accounting, brought to light the extensive use of Enron 
subsidiaries in tax haven countries, and the misdeeds of the executives of other 
corporations, such as Tyco, have apparently included tax evasion of one sort or another.   
A series of articles in the New York Times, written by David Cay Johnston, has focused 
attention on highly sophisticated tax avoidance schemes.  Finally, the deficit pendulum 
has swung back to the large positive position.  Whenever it does, politicians look for 
apparently “painless” ways to raise revenue and look to the IRS to expand its 
enforcement rather than curb its zealousness; indeed, audit resources are starting to 
increase slightly, after some years of very large declines.   
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My purpose in this paper is to offer an economics perspective on the issue of 
corporate tax reporting behavior, and to focus on what economics can contribute to the 
policy debate about corporate tax noncompliance.  If successful, this review will help to 
clarify the issues involved and identify where further research is especially needed.  
Before proceeding, though, I owe the reader an explanation for the title of the paper. 
I chose the word selfishness in the title of a paper about corporate tax reporting, including 
evasion and abusive avoidance behavior, for several reasons.  First, I want to avoid 
getting bogged down trying to distinguish between what technically is (illegal) tax 
evasion and what is (legal) tax avoidance.  Second, the title signals my intention to 
discuss the social responsibility of the corporation, and whether this is a case in which 
private agents pursuing their own “selfish” interest can promote the public good.  Finally, 
I want to emphasize the importance of addressing what is the corporate “self.”  Of course, 
to economists the word selfishness does not have the same negative connotations it 
suggests to others.  At some point in our first economics course, we read the words of 
Adam Smith: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”  Smith argued that each 
individual seeking to better the lives of his or her family (often referred to as ‘selfish” 
behavior) can, if under the appropriate institutions, promote the public good.  But the 
“invisible hand” promotes the general welfare only under certain conditions about the 
institutional framework and incentives.  I explore to what extent it applies to corporate 
tax avoidance and evasion. 
 
 
2. Some Facts 
2.1  Corporate Tax Noncompliance 
I begin with corporate tax noncompliance: corporation income tax that legally is 
owed but is not reported or paid.  Due to the nature of tax noncompliance, getting a 
handle on its magnitude is not easy.  What we do know is based on the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Tax Compliance Measurement Program, or TCMP, that featured intensive 
examinations of a random sample of tax returns filed for tax years from the early 1970’s 
until 1988; the corporate tax gap measures are primarily based on TCMP studies done in 
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1977, 1980 and 1983 and on routine operational audits from the mid-1980’s.  By 
comparing these examined returns with the original returns as filed, supplemented by 
other evidence, the IRS estimated the total amount of underreported income and 
overstated subtractions in each of these years (and projections for later years) and the 
total loss of tax revenue--the “tax gap.”  The estimates for the corporation income tax gap 
come from three sources.  For small corporations the IRS used TCMP data, adjusted for 
underreporting unlikely to be detected by the TCMP.  For medium-sized corporations, the 
gap was calculated by estimating, based on operational (i.e., non-TCMP) audits, how 
much tax revenue would have been generated if the IRS examined all these corporations’ 
tax returns.  Finally, for large corporations, because the IRS routinely examines a high 
percentage of these companies, examination results were used as the basis of estimates of 
the tax gap.1 The IRS has made tax gap estimates for tax year 2001, but not later, based 
on a rough projection from the 15- to 20-year-old TCMP and other data, assuming that 
the compliance rates for each major component have not changed in the past two 
decades.2  Corporate underreporting in 2001 is estimated at $29.9 billion, of which 
corporations with over $10 million in assets make up $25.0 billion.3 As a benchmark for 
comparison, estimated individual underreporting in 2001 is $148.8 billion. Compared to 
estimated 2001 tax year receipts paid voluntarily and in a timely fashion of $142.4 billion 
and $930.1 billion for corporate and individual income tax collections, respectively, the 
underreporting rate (calculated as underreported tax divided by receipts plus 
underreported tax) is 17.4 percent and 13.8 percent for corporations and individuals, 
respectively.    
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) calculates an annual measure of 
corporate misreporting, in order to adjust the National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA) measure of corporate profits, which is based on data from corporate tax returns as 
                                                 
1 This description is based on U.S. General Accounting Office (1988).  One potentially important problem 
with this data is that the examination reports do not distinguish between adjustments that change the timing 
of tax liability and adjustments that change the liability in a way that will not be offset in future years.  For 
this reason it is difficult to know the present value of the recommended adjustments from IRS 
examinations. 
2 The tax gap numbers are drawn from Internal Revenue Service (2004a). 
3 Underreporting is only one of the three components of the total tax gap, which is estimated to be $282.5 
billion.  The other two components are nonfiling and underpayment.  There is no estimate for corporate 
nonfiling, and underpayment is a quite different issue. 
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filed.4    The BEA estimate for corporations reporting a profit is based on actual tax 
settlements--the change in income recommended by the IRS examination team reduced 
by the overall ratio of actual settlements to recommendations.5  For loss companies, the 
adjustment is calculated by multiplying total losses by an estimate of the percentage by 
which losses are reduced during audit.  Table 1 shows the NIPA estimates of corporate 
tax misreporting since 1988, in total dollars and as a percentage of misreporting plus total 
receipts less deductions, the tax-return-based measure that the BEA procedures begin 
from.6  This ratio was 13.8 percent in 2000, compared to the 17.4 percent figure based on 
the IRS methodology that extrapolates from two-decades-old data assuming no change in 
compliance rates.  This series shows an increase in the misreporting rate since the mid-
1990’s, but puts the 2000 misreporting rate below the rates of the 1989 through 1992 
period.  The complete series (that begins in 1929) shows that this ratio never reached 10 
percent until 1981, and peaked in 1983 at 17.9 percent. 
 
2.2  Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters 
For conceptual reasons it is impossible to measure how much corporate tax 
avoidance—legal actions taken to reduce tax liability--is going on.  If avoidance is 
anything that corporations do to reduce their tax liability, it could include such activities 
as purchasing tax-exempt bonds, which is certainly legal, not at all nefarious, but also 
certainly done purely for tax reasons.  Recent attention has focused on so-called 
“abusive” tax transactions, including shelters.  The General Accounting Office defines 
abusive shelters to be “very complicated transactions promoted to corporations and 
                                                 
4 The BEA methodology is discussed in Petrick (2002, p. 7). 
5 In contrast, the IRS tax gap measures are based on the recommendations of the return audit, unadjusted 
for how much tax was ultimately assessed after any appeals process.  This is defended in part as an 
approximate adjustment for the fact that IRS examiners do not detect all underreporting.  Another 
methodological difference is that the BEA projects the average amount of recommended adjustment per 
return to all returns by multiplying this figure by the total number of returns, thus implicitly assuming that 
the examined returns are representative of all corporate returns.  In contrast, the IRS tax gap methodology 
for mid-sized corporations (with assets between $10 and $100 million) projects the results of audited 
returns to the whole population with some acknowledgment that returns audited are not representative of 
the entire population, and indeed have higher unreported income than unexamined returns.    The first 
methodological difference would make the BEA estimates of underreporting lower than the IRS tax gap 
measure, while the second methodological difference would make it higher.  I am grateful to Alan Plumley 
and Eric Toder of the IRS for insights about these issues.  
6 Note that the NIPA table refers to misreported income, not understated tax liability as in the IRS corporate 
tax gap studies. 
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wealthy individuals to exploit tax loopholes and provide large, unintended tax benefits.”7  
This is as good a definition as any, but it clearly is not a precise definition. Recently an 
IRS contractor estimated the tax revenue loss from abusive tax shelters in 1999 to be 
between $14.5 and $18.4 billion, 50 percent higher than in 1993.8  This estimate was 
based on IRS’s Statistics of Income data for the largest U.S. companies, Compustat 
financial data, and surveys of IRS field offices.  Other estimates based on familiarity with 
the industry, but not quantitative analysis, have been in the same ballpark.9  Extrapolating 
these estimates to 2001 suggests that abusive tax shelter may equal more than half of the 
total corporate tax gap. 
There is also indirect evidence that tax shelters cost the government a large and 
growing amount of revenue.  Several studies have documented a large and growing gap 
between the book income reported on public corporations’ financial statements and the 
tax income of corporations, which remains even after eliminating what arises from 
known differences in the accounting procedures used for book and tax income.10  As the 
authors of these studies admit, even the adjusted difference might have nothing at all to 
do with either evasion or abusive tax shelters.  But as of yet there is no better explanation. 
 
2.3  Corporate Tax Enforcement Resources 
 There is no disputing that IRS resources devoted to enforcement have dropped 
drastically since 1996.  Between fiscal years 1996 and 2003, the number of examination 
full-time-equivalent positions (revenue agents and tax auditors) dropped by 26 percent, 
accompanied by a sharp decline in the fraction of returns that are examined.11  Table 2 
shows how this decline in resources translated into declines in the percentage of 
corporation returns subject to examination, known as the coverage ratio.  As an example, 
                                                 
7 U.S. General Accounting Office (2003, p. 1).  The word “unintended” refers to the intentions of the 
legislators, not the promoters or taxpayers. 
8 U.S. General Accounting Office (2003, p. 13).  Several caveats to the estimates are presented there, 
including the warning that “Both IRS and contractor officials believe the …results are more useful to 
predict returns with abusive shelters than they are to value the size of the abusive shelter problem.” (p. 13) 
9 The most widely cited of such estimates is Bankman (1999), who estimated the annual revenue loss from 
abusive tax shelters at $10 billion. 
10 See Department of the Treasury (1999), Desai (2003), Manzon and Plesko (2001), and Mills, Newberry, 
and Trautman (2002). 
11 According to IRS (2004b), Table 7a, the number of total examination FTEs was 17,129 in fiscal year 
1996, and was 12,612 in 2003. 
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the coverage ratio for corporations with assets between $1 million and $5 million fell 
from 7.92 percent to 1.55 percent from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2003, and from 
51.67 percent to 29.73 percent for corporations with assets over $250 million.  Among 
Subchapter C corporations (that are subject to the corporation income tax), the coverage 
ratio rises monotonically with size, and the 1500 or so largest companies that are in the 
Coordinated Industry Case program are for the most part subject to annual, even 
continual, audit.  For these companies the decline in enforcement resources would be 
reflected not in whether there was an audit, but in the effectiveness of the audit.12 
 Of course, the declining coverage ratio and possibly declining quality of 
examinations could be a cause of increased evasion and abusive shelter use.  Although 
there is no evidence that establishes this, it would be consistent with the standard 
economic model of evasion, discussed below.   
 
3. The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness 
 
3.1  The Economic Theory of Tax Evasion: Demand 
The standard economics model of the demand for tax evasion on the part of 
taxpayers is spare but powerful.13  It poses the decision about whether to evade and, if so, 
how much to evade, as a choice regarding tax evasion as a choice under uncertainty—a 
gamble—in which there is a tradeoff between a gain if the evasion is undetected and a 
                                                 
12 Note that as of 2002, the Large and Mid-Size Business Division (LMSB) of IRS was expecting to 
increase the portion of its examination resources devoted to combating abusive shelters from 3 percent in 
2002 to 20 percent in 2004.  See U.S. General Accounting Office (2003, p. 21).  
 
13 There is a large non-economics literature--by criminologists, sociologists, lawyers, and even 
anthropologists--on corporate crime generally, that sometimes alludes to corporate tax evasion.  The classic 
work on criminology that introduced the term “white collar crime” (Sutherland 1940, 1949) paid brief 
attention to corporate tax evasion, but didn’t elaborate on its distinctive characteristics.  Much of the 
modern literature adopts a perspective on corporations that is familiar to economists: looking through the 
legal entity to the individuals within the corporation.  Conley and O’Barr (1997, p. 6) assert that “to say 
that the corporation has engaged in misconduct is to say that some of the people have misbehaved in ways 
that the law chooses to attribute to the corporate entity.”  Sociologists usually stress that organizational 
dynamics can generate actions different from those that individuals might take on their own.  For example, 
Clinard and Yeager (1980, p. 43) say that “the first step in understanding corporate illegality is to drop the 
analogy of the corporation as a person and analyze the behavior of the corporation in terms of what it really 
is: a complex organization.”   
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loss if the evasion is detected and penalized.14  In this framework, noncompliance is 
determined by the probability of detection and punishment, the penalty structure, and the 
risk aversion of the potential evader.  The framework is entirely amoral: taxpayers are 
neither honest nor dishonest, but merely rational calculators of what is in their best 
interest.  The fact that tax evasion is illegal is only relevant because, with some 
probability, it might incur a penalty.  The fact that tax payments finance government 
services that the taxpayer values is also completely irrelevant, because each taxpayer in a 
large jurisdiction free rides on the tax payments of others. 
The existing economics literature on the demand for tax evasion focuses almost 
entirely on evasion by individuals, not businesses.15  However, for a number of reasons, 
understanding tax noncompliance of large, particularly publicly-held,  companies may 
require a different conceptual framework.  For individuals, it is natural to assume that risk 
aversion—meaning that the utility cost of a big penalty is greater than the utility gain 
from an equal dollar of tax saving—limits the amount of evasion that is optimal.  This 
assumption is also plausible for closely-held small businesses whose owners’ wealth is 
generally not well-diversified.  In these situations, it is clear that the tax situation of the 
company and the tax situation of the owners are intimately related, and must be analyzed 
simultaneously.  But the assumption of risk aversion seems unsatisfactory for a large 
publicly-held firm, because presumably the shareholders hold diversified portfolios, 
implying that the firm should behave as if it is risk-neutral, even if its shareholders are 
not.  If the decision-maker acts in a risk-neutral manner, the model must contain some 
other factor that rules out corner solutions (i.e., no evasion at all if evasion is worse than a 
fair gamble, or reporting no tax liability at all if it is better than fair), such as more 
                                                 
14 The seminal paper is by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).  The subsequent economics literature on tax 
evasion and enforcement is surveyed in Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and in Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
(2002). 
15 An interesting exception is Andreoni (1992), who likens some business tax evasion to a last-resort loan 
from the IRS, with the IRS as a “loan shark;” Rice (1992), discussed below, finds some evidence that is 
consistent with this notion. There is also a small literature that addresses tax compliance by firms within the 
deterrence framework, assuming a unitary decision-maker. This strand of the literature, nicely reviewed in 
Cowell (2004), focuses on how the tax rate, probability of detection and penalty rate affect the two choices 
of evasion (usually expressed as the fraction of sales concealed from an output tax) and output, when there 
is a costly concealment technology.  Some of the models in this tradition assume that the firm is risk-
averse, while in others the firm is assumed to behave in a risk-neutral way.   
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evasion increasing the probability of detection or penalties.  Changing the standard model 
in this way generally does not qualitatively alter the predictions of the model.   
The implications of the separation between ownership and control in public 
corporations are more intriguing, for two reasons. First, many non-economist scholars, 
and some economists, argue that evasion choices made by individuals involve more than 
a cost-benefit calculation, and reflect the taxpayer’s sense of duty, perception of the 
fairness of the tax system and trust in government and the political system more 
broadly.16  There is, to be sure, much experimental and empirical evidence to suggest that 
people do not behave as free riders in all situations at all times and that taxpayer behavior 
may be affected by both intrinsic motivation (civic virtue, or duty) and extrinsic 
motivation (the threat of punishment).17  If increasing extrinsic motivation—say with 
more punitive enforcement policies—“crowds out” intrinsic motivation by making 
people feel that they pay taxes because they have to, rather than because they want to, 
deterrence-based polices may be less effective than the standard economic model of 
evasion suggests.  In this situation, compliance may be sustained by the perception that 
the tax authority acts respectfully toward citizens--while at the same time protecting the 
honest from the free rider--by giving taxpayers the benefit of the doubt when it finds a 
mistake, by sanctioning small violations more mildly, and by sanctioning large and basic 
violations more heavily.   
 It is, however, an open question whether public corporations’ tax compliance 
behavior is motivated by civic virtue, and thereby can be influenced by the factors 
outside of the deterrence model such as the perception of fair treatment. For one thing, 
much of the behavior in question is arguably about (legal) avoidance, not (illegal) 
evasion.18  There is a respectable view with a long tradition that tax avoidance raises no 
issues of ethics or virtue.  The famed judge Learned Hand said: "Over and over again 
courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs so as to keep 
taxes as low as possible.  Everybody does so, rich or poor, and all do right, for nobody 
owes any public duty to pay more taxes than the law demands.  Taxes are enforced 
                                                 
16 These new perspectives on tax evasion are critically reviewed in Slemrod (2003).  
17 Frey (1997 and elsewhere) has presented this argument. 
18 This statement applies to much of the tax avoidance behavior of individuals, as well. 
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exactions, not voluntary contributions."19  According to this view, not taking optimal 
(from the corporation’s point of view) advantage of legal opportunities for tax avoidance 
is like giving a gift to government--giving such gifts may reflect civic virtue, but not 
giving them is not a sign of ethical failure.  But not everyone agrees with Judge Hand.  
Referring to the recent spate of (legal) corporate inversions,20 Senator Charles Grassley 
of Iowa, the Ranking Republican member of the Finance Committee, remarked that 
“these expatriations aren’t illegal, but they’re sure immoral.  During a war on terrorism, 
coming out of a recession, everyone ought to be pulling together.  If companies don’t 
have their hearts in America, they ought to get out.”21  
 Because there is often no clear, bright line between avoidance and evasion, 
corporate tax planning is a matter of creative compliance, under which the companies 
“set their lawyers to work on the legal form of their activities to package or repackage 
them in ways they can claim fall beyond the ambit of disadvantageous, or within the 
ambit of advantageous, law.”22  To be sure, creative compliance is facilitated because the 
tax law is exceedingly complex and open to alternative interpretations, and this 
undoubtedly facilitates ethical rationalizations of positions taken.  But how far this is 
pushed depends on a willingness to aggressively seek out alternative interpretations and 
innovative legal forms that take advantage of gaps in the law, and the unanticipated 
effects of combining parts of the law.   
Little is known about how and why, holding constant the chance of getting caught 
and the penalty for noncompliance, corporations differ among themselves in their 
aggressiveness regarding pushing the envelope of the tax law, and whether their behavior 
would respond to initiatives designed to strengthen intrinsic motivation.  It is plausible 
that this is affected by whether the managers view paying taxes as a civic virtue or duty, 
and so abusive corporate avoidance has an ethical dimension just as evasion does, and 
may be responsive to non-deterrence aspects of the tax system.  But a manager acting in 
the interest of the shareholders arguably should repress his or her own civic virtues, and 
                                                 
19 Hand (1947). 
20 Inversion refers to when a U.S. corporation liquidates and re-forms as a company incorporated in a low-
tax foreign country that operates a territorial system of taxation (that is, it taxes only income earned within 
its borders), usually in order to reduce its U.S. tax liability on income earned outside of the United States.  
See Desai and Hines (2002). 
21 Grassley (2002). 
22 McBarnet (2001) develops this perspective. 
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not be distracted from profit maximizing.  In the classic-modern statement of this view, 
Milton Friedman argued that corporate executives as employees of the owners of the 
business have a responsibility to increase profits “while conforming to the rules and laws 
of society.”23  Friedman directed his argument at those who argue that corporations 
should contribute to social causes, which he characterized as spending the stockholders’ 
money through decreased returns, spending the customers’ money through higher prices, 
and spending the employees’ money through lower wages.  These causes may or not be 
worthwhile, argued Friedman, but the individuals whose money is being spent should 
make those decisions on an individual basis.  Friedman’s reference to conforming to the 
law makes clear that he was not advocating “optimal” tax evasion by corporations. But, 
by extension, his argument does apply to tax avoidance in the sense mentioned earlier, 
that not pursuing all legal avenues to reduce tax liability constitutes a contribution to 
government: if shareholders want to make contributions to the Bureau of Public Debt, 
that is their right, but widely-held corporations should not.  Presumably, though, 
Friedman would approve of a corporation reining in its tax aggressiveness if, for 
example, public disclosure of its behavior would damage the public image of the 
company and thereby drive away some customers or investors.  Responding in this way is 
not a contribution to a social cause but rather a defensive investment to increase profits 
and, ultimately, share price.24 
 How tax-aggressive the shareholders want the corporation to be has to be 
conveyed to the managers who make such decisions.  How this gets conveyed is ignored 
in nearly all of the small existing literature on business tax noncompliance, which 
assumes that the firm owner makes the tax reporting decision without delegating 
decision-making responsibility.25 Although this assumption makes sense for small, 
closely-held businesses, in a large, publicly-held corporation decisions about taxes (and, 
inter alia, accounting) are not made by the shareholders directly but rather by their 
agents, whether that is the chief financial officer or the vice president for taxation.  In 
                                                 
23 Friedman  (1970). 
24 Many of these issues have been addressed in the context of corporate environmentalism. 
25 One exception is Chen and Chu (forthcoming), who investigate corporate tax evasion with a standard 
principal-agent model in which a risk-neutral owner of a firm hires a risk-averse manager.  They focus on 
the efficiency loss due to the separation of management and control, and do not address the relative 
efficacy of penalties on the principal and agent, a key focus of Crocker and Slemrod (forthcoming), 
discussed below.  
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order to align the incentives of the decision-makers with the interests of the shareholders, 
the shareholders can tie the decision-makers’ compensation, explicitly or implicitly, to 
observable outcomes such as the average effective tax rate or after-tax corporation 
profitability that affect the share price, or else tie compensation directly to the share price, 
as through the granting of stock options or restricted stock.   
 In this setting the insights generated by the standard deterrence model of the 
demand for evasion may not apply.  For example, if penalties for evasion apply to the 
agent, the company can alter the compensation contract with the tax director, to offset the 
intended consequences of IRS policy.  Enforcement strategies directed at the tax director 
and at the corporation itself may have different impacts on corporate behavior.  Because 
each of these policies is available to the government, it is valuable to know whether there 
is an a priori reason to prefer one to the other.26   
That tax departments are increasingly counted on as innovative profit centers and 
that tax managers are increasingly provided incentives to produce profit is consistent with 
evidence from a 2001 survey of corporate tax departments.27  Of the various measures 
used to evaluate the performance of tax departments, the one most often cited was the 
savings, or value added, they provided:  86 percent cited this performance measure, up 
from 75 percent in 1997.  Of those 86 percent, 63 percent said that this measure affected 
the compensation of tax department personnel.  The effective tax rate was cited as a 
measure used to evaluate performance by 58 percent of respondents, up from 48 percent 
in 1997.  Furthermore, the number of mentions of each of three possible performance 
measures that included the word “accuracy” declined substantially between 1997 and 
2001.  In a separate survey of Fortune 1000 tax directors, 46 percent of the directors 
                                                 
26 It has not always been that way under U.S. law.  Although in the 19th century courts held corporations 
responsible for an assortment of crimes under the strict liability rule—that is, when “intent” is not 
relevant—courts demonstrated an aversion to punishing corporations for such crimes.  Before that the 
prevailing doctrine held that (1) corporations are legal artifacts that do not have a mind or soul, and thus 
cannot have criminal intent, (2) the corporation is not authorized to do unlawful acts so if they do, they do 
in their personal capacity, and (3) fines are injurious to stockholders rather than the agents who are directly 
responsible for the violations of the law.  It was only in 1909, in New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. v. United 
States 212 U.S. 481, that the Supreme Court established clearly that corporations could commit and be 
punished for a large class of crimes.  See Sutherland (1949, p. 52).    The issue of whether corporations can 
be punished has a long history.  In 1250 Pope Innocent IV stated that corporations could not be 
excommunicated because they, unlike their owners, had neither minds nor souls, and therefore could not 
sin. 
27 Hollingsworth (2002, pp. 67-8). 
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ranked the effective tax rate as the most important factor driving the tax department’s 
overall objectives, compared to 16 percent who ranked compliance first.  Even more 
strikingly, when asked about the single most important factor used to evaluate the 
performance of the tax department, 36 percent said the effective tax rate, while none said 
accuracy.28 
 Whether enforcement directed at the company or at the tax director is more 
effective can be addressed in a costly state falsification model, in which the tax manager 
is assumed to possess private information regarding the extent of legally permissible 
reductions in taxable income, and may also lower tax liability through illegal evasion.29  
In such a model only the latter has real costs, but the shareholders cannot distinguish 
between the two so, to the extent it is incentivized, the tax manager’s compensation must 
rely on measures, such as average tax rates, that depend on both legal avoidance and 
illegal tax evasion.30  The incentives of the manager to engage in tax evasion are affected 
by the nature of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and the 
manager of the company’s tax affairs, and one can characterize formally how the optimal 
incentive compensation contract for the manager will change in response to alternative 
enforcement policies imposed by the IRS.31  In this model penalties imposed on the 
manager directly are more effective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on 
shareholders, because the latter are diluted when they are conveyed to the tax decision-
makers via changes in the compensation contract that adjusts partially to the incentives 
generated by increased sanctions against illegal evasion.32   
 This framework provides some insight into a policy initiative that has attracted 
some attention recently: public disclosure of certain bottom-line items, such as tax 
                                                 
28 Clark, Martire & Bartolomeo, Inc. (2000). 
29 Crocker and Slemrod (forthcoming).  
30 The model assumes that information about how much evasion occurred becomes public information too 
late for it to be part of the compensation contract. 
31 A literature in the law and economics field investigates the socially optimal division of sanctions on 
corporations and individual employees for social harms generally.  For example, Kraakman (1984) 
emphasizes the possibility that the corporation’s assets are inadequate to pay for the harm.  Polinsky and 
Shavell (1993) argue that the total magnitude of public sanctions may exceed the sanctions that a firm can 
impose on its employees.   
32 The model does not consider another possible effect of imposing penalties directly on managers—that 
over time tax managers will be drawn from people who have a relatively low cost of a given monetary 
penalty. 
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liability, from corporation income tax returns.33  It suggests that public disclosure will 
facilitate performance-based compensation for corporate tax managers, because it would 
enable benchmarking of their performance against the performance of competitors 
subject to unobservable but correlated shocks to the company’s own tax situation.  Thus, 
any reduction in evasion due to corporations’ wish to avoid being publicly labeled a tax 
avoider would to some extent be offset by the improved ability of corporations to fine-
tune the incentives for tax minimization they offer their tax directors. 
 The same modeling framework can address the fact that, as recent corporate 
scandals attest to, compensation contracts that reward managerial performance also 
reward misreporting by managers of indicators of that performance, such as income.  To 
be sure, there are principal-agent models that can accommodate either the problem of 
“hidden action” (when the actions of the managers are unobservable) or the problem of 
“hidden information” (when the information provided by managers cannot be verified), 
but not both.  Recent research has, though, formalized how the optimal design of 
managerial compensation balances incentivizing the managers and minimizing the cost of 
falsified information.34  In general the optimal contract does not eliminate accounting 
fraud, as to do that would too greatly limit the incentives provided to the manager to take 
actions that legitimately increase earnings.  The next step in this research agenda is to see 
what insights are generated by a model in which both accounting reports and tax reports 
can be falsified, and there is some cost to having the two reports diverge.  In such a 
framework, the proposed new M-3 schedule on corporation tax returns, designed to make 
differences between financial accounting income and taxable income more transparent, 
increases the amount of information provided to the IRS. 
The attention to managerial compensation suggests that any trend toward 
increased corporate tax noncompliance could be the result of the proliferation of stock 
options and other incentivized compensation.  However, this explanation leaves open 
                                                 
33 See Lenter, Shackelford, and Slemrod (2003) for a discussion of the arguments for and against this 
proposal. 
34 Crocker and Slemrod (2004).  See also Goldman and Slezak (2003). 
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whether the relationship is causal or whether both trends resulted from a change in 
“corporate culture.”35 
The most basic predictions of the deterrence model as it relates to the demand for 
corporate tax noncompliance--that higher penalties and higher probabilities of penalties 
being imposed deter evasion--have not been subject to much empirical testing.  Some 
intriguing empirical patterns did emerge from a careful econometric study of small (with 
assets between $1 and $10 million in 1980) corporations based on TCMP data.36  It 
showed that compliance is positively related to being publicly traded and in a highly 
regulated industry, so that characteristics that assure public disclosure of information also 
tend to encourage better tax compliance.37  Second, the empirical analysis suggests that 
firm profitability exerts two opposing effects.  Managers of corporations whose profit 
performance falls short of its industry norm may resort to noncompliance as a means of 
shaving costs.  In contrast, high-profit companies may take advantage of their greater 
ability to underreport income without being audited. Finally, although the reporting gap 
grows with value added as a measure of firm size, the ratio of noncompliance to value-
added declines with firm size, suggesting that noncompliance is a regressive 
phenomenon, at least among this group of smaller companies.38   
There is some empirical evidence linking how executives are compensated and 
the likelihood of accounting manipulation and fraud.  Companies whose CEOs have 
relatively high amounts of equity incentives, in the form of unrestricted stock and 
immediately exercisable options, are more likely to engage in earnings management by 
reporting small earnings increases more than small earnings decreases and also reporting 
long strings of increasing earnings.39  Earnings management intensity, as measured by the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, is increasing in the amount of stock-based 
                                                 
35 Anecdotal familiarity with corporate tax departments suggests that there is (or was, until recently) a large 
cross-sectional variation in corporate culture relating to tax aggressiveness.  What underlies this variation 
has not been explored much by economists, although see Kreps (1990) for an essay that relates corporate 
culture to establishing a reputation for reasonably resolving unforeseen circumstances.  However, because 
how tax-aggressive a company is seldom publicly revealed, it is unlikely to affect this sort of reputation.  
36 Rice (1992). 
37 Tannenbaum (1993) argued the Rice (1992) finding that publicly-traded companies have higher 
compliance may have nothing to do with public disclosure, and instead might reflect the fact that publicly-
traded companies are more likely to have managers who are independent of its owners, and therefore are 
less fearful of commingling the owners’ personal affairs with those of the corporation.  
38 See also Morton (1992) on the characteristics of small business tax noncompliance. 
39 Ke (2002). 
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compensation (including options) and bonuses, and decreasing in salaries.40  There is 
mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between the form of executive 
compensation and accounting fraud.  An early study based on a sample limited to 
companies in high-growth industries found no evidence of a link between executive 
compensation (specifically, whether the firm had an earnings-based bonus plan) and SEC 
enforcement actions, but a more sophisticated recent analysis of firms accused of 
accounting fraud by the SEC found that the probability of accounting fraud is increasing 
in the percent of total executive compensation that is stock-based, controlling for the 
financing needs and governance characteristics of the firm.41  Thus, there is empirical 
support for the notion that a byproduct of incentivizing executive compensation to align 
their interest with the shareholders is an increased incentive to falsify accounting reports.  
The same may be true of tax reporting, but this has not yet been demonstrated. Nor are 
the theoretical issues identical, because with tax evasion there is a third party other than 
the shareholders and the managers—the IRS, representing all taxpayers’ interests—and 
therefore in some situations both the shareholders and managers can profit at the expense 
of the taxpayers.   
Finally, there is intriguing evidence linking the tax reporting behavior of 
companies to the tax reporting behavior on their personal tax returns of the managers of 
these companies.  For companies with assets of $10 million or less, noncompliant firms 
are three times more likely to be managed by executives who have understated personal 
taxes, even when the measure of personal noncompliance excludes business-related 
income.42  This result suggests that, at least for relatively small corporations, managerial 
preferences play a role in determining corporate tax noncompliance.  There is no 
systematic evidence demonstrates that this is also true for large public companies, where 
the separation of ownership and control is more of an issue, although there is certainly 
anecdotal evidence (e.g., Tyco’s accounting fraud and the personal tax evasion of its 
                                                 
40 Gao and Shrieves (2002) and Cheng and Warfield (2002). 
41 Dechow et al. (1996) and Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004b). 
42 Joulfaian (2000).  The relationship is less strong when the measure of personal noncompliance excludes 
business-related income.  This evidence may in part reflect endogenous discovery on the part of the IRS: if 
they find that someone evades on their individual tax account, they look at the companies they are involved 
with, and vice versa.  
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CEO, Dennis Kozlowski) of the two going hand in hand when corporate governance is 
inadequate. 
 
3.2  The Industrial Organization of the Tax Shelter Business: Supply 
Another shortcoming of the traditional economic model of tax evasion based on 
deterrence is that it considers only one side of the market for tax noncompliance—the 
demand on the part of taxpayers.  The model’s implicit assumption is that there is an 
unlimited supply of tax evasion opportunities at a constant “price.”  This assumption 
seems reasonable when the act of evasion is, as in the traditional tax evasion model 
designed with individual evasion in mind, envisioned as a simple underreporting of 
income.43  It is a less attractive assumption when the issue is abusive tax shelters, where 
there is a sector comprised of companies with specialized information about the tax law 
and financial transactions that combine aspects of the tax law to produce highly 
complicated tax shelters and market them to corporations.   
Many believe that this market has grown substantially in recent years.  Fortune 
magazine recently reported that “with encouragement from shelter hustlers, a new 
attitude is spreading: that the corporate tax department is a profit center all its own, and 
that a high effective tax rate is a sign of weakness. ‘A potential client once said he would 
hire the firm if we could get their tax rate down, because it was higher than their 
competitors' and they were embarrassed,’ says one accountant.”44  The Joint Committee 
on Taxation’s report on Enron used the same language, asserting that "Enron's tax 
department became a source for financial statement earnings, thereby making it a profit 
center for the company."45  The former Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy, 
Pamela F. Olson, also laid part of the blame for abusive tax shelters on the promoters, 
asserting that “the sophistication of the transactions, combined with the cultural laxity 
engendered among some taxpayers and promoters in the 90’s, made them possible.”46 
                                                 
43 When the act of evasion consist of supplying labor to the informal sector, the return to that activity may 
decline as entry increases. 
44 Novack (1998).  
45 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (2003, p. 8). 
46 Olson (2003, p. 2). 
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The ubiquity of tax shelters is reflected in a recent survey of the tax professionals 
retained by medium-sized corporations.47  It revealed that 69.4 percent had been asked by 
clients to look into tax shelters, and 55.5 percent had been approached by promoters 
advertising tax shelters; only 7.5 percent admitted actually setting up a tax shelter for a 
client.  Undoubtedly, nearly all large corporations have been solicited by tax shelter 
promoters, and nearly all have considered pursuing them. 
Is there a supply-side explanation for the post-1990 growth in tax shelters?  There 
has been little systematic investigation of this issue, although a number of developments 
over this period may have contributed to a reduction in the effective cost of providing a 
shelter.  One is the availability of increasingly sophisticated financial instruments that 
facilitate eliminating the real risk exposure caused by a shelter and thereby isolating the 
tax benefits.  Another is the consolidation of the shelter business among the Big Five 
accounting firms that can amortize the cost of developing a shelter over many purchasers.  
Finally, some court decisions that favored a more literal reading of the tax laws reduced 
the expected penalties associated with aggressive tax shelters.48 
Understanding this sector is particularly important because several recent IRS 
enforcement initiatives have focused on the promoters of tax shelters rather than the 
taxpayers themselves, in part because of the difficulty of detecting taxpayer use of 
shelters even if the IRS has access to the company’s financial information and the tax 
return.  For example, promoters (and taxpayers) are now required to disclose or register 
transactions and maintain investor lists for six categories of transactions:  tax avoidance 
transactions, transactions that generate large tax losses, transactions that generate large 
book-tax differences, transactions with contractual protection, transactions that are 
marketed on a confidential basis, and transactions that result in tax credits even though 
the underlying assets are held for a brief period of time.   The IRS Commissioner has said 
that “by auditing promoters and obtaining investor lists, we [IRS] can deter the promotion 
of as well the thirst for such products.”49  (Notably, though, there is currently no penalty 
for a taxpayer’s failure to disclose a reportable transaction, and the penalties on 
promoters for the failure to register a transaction or the failure to maintain lists of 
                                                 
47 Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002). 
48 I thank Joe Bankman for suggesting this characterization of the supply-side changes. 
49 Everson (2003, p. 7). 
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participating taxpayers are low.)  Moreover, Circular 230, which establishes standards of 
ethical conduct required of professionals who practice before the IRS, is being reviewed 
to see if it can be revised to help curb abusive transactions.   
The IRS Commissioner has also stressed the importance of reacting quickly: 
“Failure to identify and react to abusive transactions quickly…can allow the transaction 
to spread…”50   However, adapting theoretical models of patent races to the case of tax 
shelters suggest caution regarding the success of a strategy of reforming tax laws and 
regulations to reduce the effectiveness of elaborate tax avoidance techniques as soon as 
they are identified.  Unless the tax law changes and new regulations can be made 
retroactive, which may be undesirable on other grounds, a highly reactive policy may 
encourage the rapid development of new tax avoidance techniques by innovators and 
thereby place a great premium on being the first to develop and use a new tax avoidance 
method.51  It might make more sense for the IRS to immediately publicize the tax 
avoidance techniques they uncover, in the hope of discouraging others from subsequently 
developing other methods.  Indeed, the Treasury is considering implementing “yellow 
light” rulings, public announcements that the IRS is aware of and evaluating a class of 
transactions, even though the analysis may not be complete.52 
The industrial organization of the tax promoter and tax planning business may be 
affected by the Sarbanes-Oxley bill passed in 2002.  As of now, neither Sarbanes-Oxley 
nor Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules prohibit a company’s audit firm 
from providing tax services that are pre-approved by the company’s audit committee.  
However, the SEC distinguished traditional tax compliance and planning services from 
the marketing of novel, tax-driven, financial products, referring to the Conference 
Board’s Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise that, as a “best practice,” 
auditors should not provide advice on “novel and debatable tax strategies and products 
that involve income tax shelters.”53  The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants has also suggested that “advice on tax strategies having no business purpose 
other than tax avoidance is an appropriate dividing line for activities that should be 
                                                 
50 Everson (2003, p. 4). 
51 This point is made in Hines (2004). 
52 Everson (2003, p. 6). 
53 Conference Board (2003, p. 36). 
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prohibited to auditing firms registered under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”54  The newly 
formed Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has stated that “by looking at 
compensation, promotion, and retention issues, our inspections will identify a firm’s 
policies and practices that create incentives for firm audit personnel to promote such 
transactions to their clients.”55  At its March 2003 meeting, the Board of Administration 
of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System voted unanimously to withhold 
its vote for directors if necessary and take additional actions to help ensure the 
independence of the external auditor, including that the auditor should not be engaged in 
any tax-related consulting work with audit clients outside the scope of the audit . 
 
3.3 Supply Meets Demand 
 
Once we recognize that for some types of abusive avoidance or evasion the 
supply side is relevant, we can gain insight from the theory of tax incidence, which 
addresses who ultimately bears the burden of a tax or other aspect of the tax system.  
Incidence theory suggests that the answer depends on the elasticity of supply relative to 
the elasticity of demand.  The more elastic is demand relative to supply, the less likely is 
the burden likely to reside on the consumer of the taxed product, and the more likely it is 
to be shifted away through price changes.  Because in the long run the resources used by 
tax shelter promoters probably do have good alternative uses—suggesting that the long-
run supply elasticity is high—penalties to either the taxpayer or the promoters will in the 
long run be borne by the taxpayers.  But the short-run incidence may differ, depending on 
the structure of the tax shelter sector. 
More intriguingly, the foregoing discussion calls into question a fundamental 
tenet of tax incidence theory—that the impact of a tax does not depend on which side of 
the market remits, or has the legal liability for, the tax.  Every public finance textbook 
features a supply-and-demand diagram illustrating how the incidence and efficiency 
effects of a tax on say, food, will be the same whether the supplier or consumer must pay 
the tax.  (Sometimes it is unclear whether “pay” means “remit” or “is legally liable for.”)  
Of course, any tax administrator will tell you that this ubiquitous textbook assertion is 
                                                 
54 AICPA (2003).  
55 McDonough (2003, p. 9).   
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hopelessly naïve.  When one accounts for the administrative and compliance costs of 
raising taxes, which side of the market remits the tax is not at all a matter of indifference.  
Indeed, the issue of whether income taxes should be collected at “source” figures 
prominently in the modern history of the income tax.  The first modern British income 
tax, introduced in 1799 by Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer William Pitt, 
was judged to be a failure, mostly because it raised much less revenue than expected and 
was plagued with evasion.  Its re-introduction in 1803 by Pitt’s successor Henry 
Addington was a success, the key design change being the collection of revenues at 
source, which to this day remains the backbone of the British, and most other countries’, 
income tax systems.56   
The textbook equivalence of Pitt’s and Addington’s income tax did not apply to 
Great Britain two centuries ago, nor does it apply in many situations today.  The point of 
tax collection is not immaterial, and often there are ways for the government to collect 
taxes that are economically equivalent according to the textbooks but are not equally 
efficient in practice.  Consider how taxes on labor income are collected.  The legal 
liability for the payment of income tax on wages and salaries rests on the worker, but via 
withholding employers remit 78 percent of total personal income tax.  For most 
individual taxpayers, the act of filing a tax return is associated with a refund of money, 
not a payment.  The IRS correctly believes that it is much more efficient to collect and 
monitor taxes remitted by a smaller group of employers compared to taxes remitted by a 
hundred million or so employees.   
This discussion touches on one of the principal arguments for the corporation 
income tax—that it is an efficient way to withhold tax on behalf of shareholders.  Richard 
Bird of the University of Toronto has stated this argument best: “The key to effective 
taxation is information, and the key to information in the modern economy is the 
corporation.  The corporation is thus the modern fiscal state’s equivalent of the customs 
barrier at the border.”57  Even in a completely integrated system, the point of collection 
can be either the corporation or the shareholder.  Under the latter system, shareholders 
would report their share of the pre-corporation earnings as taxable income based on 
                                                 
56 The Pitt-Addington episode is wonderfully recounted in Farnsworth (1951). 
57 Bird (1996). 
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information provided to them by the company.  If the corporation is the point of 
collection, each shareholder would receive a credit against tax liability equal to the share 
of corporation income taxes already paid (also based on company-provided information).  
As long as the corporate tax rate is near the top of the individual tax rate scale, the filing 
of individual tax returns would be, for most taxpayers, an occasion to get refunds rather 
than pay additional tax.  Even absent integration, the responsibility for remitting a special 
tax on corporate-source income could, in principle, rest with the shareholders rather than 
with the corporate entity. If the shareholder is the point of collection, no crediting system 
is required.   
The apparent proliferation of corporate tax shelters challenges the notion that the 
corporation is the more efficient node of collection.  If there are economies of scale in the 
consumption of tax shelters, then collecting tax revenue from corporations might not be 
that much more efficient than collecting it from shareholders, after all.   Indeed, because 
of the possibility of information reporting by corporations and matching this information 
with shareholders’ income tax returns, dividend receipts are arguably much easier to 
monitor than corporation income.   
Resolving this issue brings us back to the separation of ownership and decision-
making.  Consider this question: would a corporation be as tax-aggressive if the tax 
savings accrued directly to the shareholders by lowering their personal tax liability, and 
not to the corporation?  If the answer to this question is yes, then the point of collection is 
immaterial to tax shelter policy.  I suspect, though, that the answer is no, and that tax 
savings that accrue directly to the shareholders would not, on average, be pursued quite 
as aggressively by public corporations. 
Public corporations also differ from individuals because they must report income 
in their financial statements.  To be sure, the income concepts and rules governing 
financial statement income and taxable income are different.  But in some areas, such as 
the choice of LIFO or FIFO inventory accounting, they must be the same.  There is 
abundant evidence that corporations often make accounting decisions that increase tax 
liability but allow them to report higher income in their financial statements.58  Indeed, 
there is evidence that companies that fraudulently overstated their financial statement 
                                                 
58 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a review of this evidence. 
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income paid more tax than otherwise by so doing.59  The apparent fact that many 
corporate managers are willing to pay more tax in order to report higher income on their 
financial statements could possibly be used as a tax enforcement instrument, by linking 
tax liability explicitly to financial statement income.  Such a system was in place in 1987 
and 1988, when the corporate alternative minimum tax base included one-half of any 
positive difference between financial statement income and taxable income. 
This discussion about the positive economics of corporate tax reporting behavior 
highlights that there is a wide range of possible policy responses to corporate tax 
selfishness.  First are the demand-side, deterrence instruments, such as increasing the 
probability of detection of evasion and the attendant penalties, with particular attention to 
whether the penalties are assessed on the corporation, corporate executives, or on the 
firms or individuals that comprise the supply side of tax shelters, promoters and so on.  
Second are policies that rely on the particular characteristics of the supply side of tax 
shelters, such as rules about disclosure of certain transactions to the IRS and public 
disclosure of the IRS regarding questionable tax arrangements it is investigating.  The 
third, more loosely defined, policy category focuses on the unique nature of public 
corporations as a point of tax remittance.  It includes tying dividend tax relief to corporate 
tax payments,60 public disclosure of corporate tax liabilities, and an alternative minimum 
tax based on financial statement income.   
 
4. Why Should We Care? 
 
Corporate tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance are matters of public policy 
concern because they affect the fairness of the distribution of the tax burden as well as the 
resource cost of raising taxes--bread-and-butter concerns of public economics.  What 
insights can an economics perspective offer to policy makers? 
According to the economic theory of taxation, the incidence of corporation taxes 
must be traced back to which people ultimately bear the burden of taxation-- be they the 
                                                 
59 See Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004a). 
60 The law could require corporations to have paid least the full 35 percent corporate tax rate on the amount 
of income that underlies any dividends in order for the dividends to qualify for preferential personal 
taxation.  A variant of this approach was part of the 2003 Bush administration corporate tax proposal, but it 
did not survive in the legislation that established a maximum 15 percent tax rate on dividends. 
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company’s shareholders, managers, workers, or customers; from this perspective, it is not 
interesting or even meaningful to say corporations are worse off or better off as a result 
of a particular tax change.  How the burden of the corporation income tax is distributed 
among these groups remains highly controversial, and economic analysis focuses on how 
the tax is shifted through its effect on the pre-tax rate of return, the prevailing wage rate, 
and the relative price of corporate-produced goods.  Note, though, that the theory of 
corporation income tax incidence addresses a tax policy that applies generally to all 
corporations.  A singular act of evasion does not, by definition, apply to all corporations.  
Although a policy that facilitates evasion for all corporations might attract entry and 
thereby be shifted to customers through lower prices, a successful act of evasion by one 
corporation will not be met by increased pressure from competitors.  Thus, the windfall 
gains to those companies that successfully play the tax lottery by acting aggressively 
probably accrue to the shareholders in their role as residual claimants, shared to some 
extent with the tax managers through incentivized compensation contracts.   
If there are particular characteristics of corporations in certain sectors that 
facilitate evasion or abusive avoidance, such as the presence of corporate intangibles, the 
apparent gains that accrue to firms in these sectors via a lower effective tax rate will be 
partially eroded to the extent that competitors have similar characteristics, and partly 
benefit some other constituency, including this sector’s customers.  The same argument 
applies to the incidence of increasing deterrence instruments, such as the penalties for 
detected evasion.  As discussed earlier, the industrial organization of the tax shelter 
promoter business will also be a factor in determining how the tax savings are shared 
among the taxpayers and the tax shelter promoters.  For example, if the promoter 
business is perfectly competitive with free entry, in the long run most of the gains from 
tax shelter “innovation” will accrue to the taxpayers; if not, some of the gain will accrue 
to the promoters via high fees.61   
Policies toward evasion and avoidance can, and should, also be evaluated as to 
how they affect the resource cost of raising taxes.  The tools of efficiency analysis and 
optimal taxation can be extended in a fairly straightforward way so that they cover 
enforcement policy instruments, such as the audit rate and penalties for detected tax 
                                                 
61 See Gergen (2002) for a related discussion.  The insights of Hines (2004) also apply to this issue. 
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misreporting.62  Doing so reveals that tax policy instruments should be utilized so as to 
equalize the marginal efficiency cost per dollar of revenue raised, which should in turn 
equal the marginal social benefit of raising revenue.  Expanding enforcement until the 
marginal additional revenue collected equals the marginal cost is, upon reflection, the 
wrong rule, because it mistakenly equates a transfer from the private sector to the public 
sector with the marginal social benefit of raising revenue.63 
Opportunities for tax evasion and abusive avoidance can distort resource 
allocation in a variety of ways.  It can cause inter-sectoral distortions because, for 
example, companies that otherwise would not find it attractive might have a financial 
subsidiary, or set up operations in a tax haven, to facilitate or camouflage abusive 
avoidance or evasion.   
An important and fascinating question concerns the relationship between evasion 
or abusive avoidance and aggregate corporate activity.  Could cracking down on this 
behavior decrease corporate investment, because it eliminates what was essentially a do-
it-yourself tax cut?  The answer depends on the relationship between the marginal cost to 
the taxpayer of avoiding (if there were no cost, no tax would be paid) and the volume of 
investment it undertakes.64  If there is no relationship, then cracking down on avoidance 
and thereby increasing its cost will not decrease investment.  More likely, the private cost 
of a given (absolute, not relative) level of avoidance is lower when the scale of real 
operations is higher, so that there is an implicit subsidy to investment.  For example, 
shifting a given amount of taxable income to a low-tax country is more likely to escape 
transfer pricing rules the larger is the amount of real activity in the low-tax country.  If 
this is true, an “avoidance facilitating” effect makes real investment in the low-tax 
country more attractive than otherwise, because increasing the scale of operations allows 
more avoidance.   
                                                 
62 See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996) for how to generalize optimal taxation theory to cover enforcement 
policy, and the pitfalls of doing so.   
63 The question of optimal enforcement has an interesting international dimension.  From the point of view 
of any one country, it makes more sense to go after tax shifted out of the United States by a U.S. taxpayer 
to another country as opposed to purely domestic evasion, because the U.S. taxpayer is at the margin 
indifferent to which treasury the payment is made.  From a global perspective, which treasury receives the 
tax is only a distributional question, implying too many enforcement resources are devoted to enforcement 
of cross-border income shifting.     
64 This reasoning is developed in Slemrod (2001). 
 25
  Neither tax evasion nor abusive tax avoidance directly creates value.  Rather, tax 
selfishness of either form is about rent seeking—transferring resources to the successfully 
tax-minimizing company (more specifically, its stakeholders), and away from all other 
taxpayers or beneficiaries of government programs.  Consider the following thought 
experiment: what if all corporate taxpayers were equally successful at reducing their tax 
liability by the same percentage, and in response the government increased corporate tax 
rates to maintain its corporate tax revenues?  In this case, we are all back where we 
started, with no valuable new consumer products created and new techniques for 
producing the same products more efficiently.  In fact, society is worse off than where we 
started, because the process of tax planning and tax minimization is expensive.  On 
average the compliance cost of the federal and state income tax systems for a Fortune 500 
company is more than $2 million.65  For mid-sized companies, the aggregate compliance 
cost is about $22 billion.66  Not all of the compliance costs are associated with tax 
planning done voluntarily by the corporation to reduce its effective tax rate. Some of it is 
old-fashioned compliance cost—cost-center overhead rather than profit-center 
investment—incurred in the prosaic chores of keeping records, calculating tax, and filing 
the necessary forms.  Much of the cost is, though, associated with the effort to bring tax 
payments down.  Indeed, there is evidence that, for large companies, higher compliance 
costs are associated with a lower effective tax rate, other things equal, suggesting that at 
least some of these costs represent tax planning.67 
All of this cost, whether voluntarily incurred or not, represents a cost to the 
nation.  What is done voluntarily will generally be a good investment ex ante from the 
company’s, or the shareholders’, perspective, but from the country’s point of view it 
represents a deadweight loss.  It is the responsibility of government to choose a tax 
enforcement policy that minimizes the sum of the cost of enforcement and compliance 
(and distortions to private behavior) while raising revenue in an equitable way.  This is 
the best we can do given the existing level of civic virtue.  Perhaps exhortations to 
                                                 
65 Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996). 
66 Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002). 
67 Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998). 
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corporations to abandon tax minimization may enable the IRS to back off a bit, but I am 
doubtful that the intrinsic motivation for corporate tax payments is a strong force.68 
 
5. Policy 
This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive evaluation of public policy 
toward corporate tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.  But hopefully the foregoing 
discussion sheds some light on the policy options.  The standard deterrence model 
suggests that evasion will decline if more enforcement resources can increase the 
probability of detection, and if the penalties applied upon detection are increased.  A 
deterrence model of large publicly-owned corporations focuses attention on to whom the 
penalties should be applied, and on the relationship of tax enforcement policy and 
accounting policy.  The standard model also presumes that evasion is detected 
immediately upon audit, but the complexity and opacity of abusive tax shelter 
arrangements imply that policy be focused on inducing disclosure of information to the 
IRS, and on the supply side of the tax shelter promoter business.  Public disclosure of tax 
shelter information and book-tax differences may reduce the return to tax shelter 
schemes, but the timing of the release is likely to be critical.  Public disclosure of the tax 
liability of corporations may focus public and legislative attention on the tax system and 
might possibly “shame” corporations into being less aggressive, but this can’t be counted 
on and may even backfire if it facilitates the benchmarking of corporate tax department 
performance against the performance of competitors and causes a race to the bottom. 
Imposing a tax cost on the divergence of financial statement income and taxable income 
might to some extent harness for tax enforcement the value managers appear to place on 
public reports of profitability. 
Beyond the scope of this paper is the issue of to what extent policies addressed at 
enforcement of corporate tax evasion and abusive avoidance are inherently difficult 
because of the fundamental incoherency of the existing, or any, income tax.  There is 
something to this argument, although it is not very helpful for evaluating enforcement 
                                                 
68 Although it is unlikely that any one corporation will unilaterally abandon tax planning (doing so could 
expose it to shareholder suits), corporate associations might facilitate voluntary restraint, if only to forestall 
more onerous anti-shelter legislation.   Even this is made less likely by the specter of competitors from 
foreign countries who are not members of these associations. 
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policy under the current tax system.  We must also be careful not to presume that 
alternative tax systems that exist only in blueprint would be immune to inconsistencies 
and shelter opportunities once hundreds of billion dollars of tax payments are in play.69 
  
 6.  Research Agenda 
 
 The policy and practice of corporate tax avoidance and evasion are ahead of 
economic theory and empirical analysis.  This may be inevitable, given the inherent 
difficulty of obtaining information about practices that are either definitely or arguably 
illegal.  A larger methodological issue lurks, as well.  Our empirical understanding of 
corporate behavior depends mostly on two sources of data, (publicly-available) financial 
statements and (confidential, but characterized in aggregated form) tax returns. Both 
sources of data are snapshots of what the corporate taxpayer wants some audience—
either the investing public or the IRS--to see, and are not necessarily accurate portrayals 
of the real, underlying activities or the financial status of the taxpayer.  In recent years 
many investors have been reminded of this fact the hard way.  We academics may be 
misled along with the investors and the IRS if we ignore this and blithely assume the 
reports to be the unvarnished truth. 
We should be challenged, and not distracted, by this conundrum.  There is a set of 
empirical questions on which we can make progress, such as the interaction between 
sheltering and real decisions, the cross-sectional determinants of corporate evasion and 
the use of abusive tax shelters, and how accounting rules and enforcement affect tax 
reporting and real decisions.  There are subtle policy questions, such as the impact of 
public disclosure of corporate tax return information, linking tax liability to financial 
statement income, and the impact of penalties on corporate directors and abusive tax 
shelter promoters, to which clear thinking about the demand and supply of tax evasion 
and abusive avoidance can contribute. 
 
                                                 
69 For example, see Weisbach (2000) for a discussion of the loopholes that might arise under a Hall-
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NIPA Estimate of Misreporting on Corporate Income Tax Returns, 1988-2000 
   Ratio of Misreporting 
   to Misreporting 
 Misreporting Total Receipts Less Plus Total Receipts  
 Estimate ($bil.) Total Deductions ($bil.) Less Total Deductions (%) 
    
1988 60.9 412.1 12.9 
1989 66.7 391.6 14.6 
1990 65.2 378.8 14.7 
1991 67.6 352.1 16.1 
1992 70.7 415.0 14.6 
1993 72.5 507.9 12.5 
1994 78.1 585.1 11.8 
1995 85.7 717.8 10.7 
1996 94.1 797.6 10.6 
1997 107.7 905.5 10.6 
1998 119.5 834.5 12.5 
1999 136.1 925.4 12.8 
2000 146.8 914.2 13.8 
    
 
Source:  National Income and Product Accounts, Table 7.16, lines 1 and 2. 
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Table 2        
Examination Coverage Percentages for Corporations, by Asset Class     
Fiscal Years 1996-2003        
   
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Corporation income tax returns, total          2.34 2.73 2.09 1.54 1.13 0.96 0.97 0.88 
  Balance sheet returns by size of    
    total assets:   
    Under $250,000 1.04 1.20 0.77 0.46 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.24 
    $250,000 under $1,000,000 2.76 3.58 2.52 1.68 1.10 0.78 0.76 0.64 
    $1,000,000 under $5,000,000 6.64 7.92 6.39 4.92 2.97 2.05 2.08 1.55 
    $5,000,000 under $10,000,000 14.08 16.40 13.51 10.27 7.01 5.33 4.63 3.46 
    $10,000,000 under $50,000,000 19.88 20.59 17.99 14.86 11.69 9.67 7.79 6.23 
    $50,000,000 under $100,000,000 21.29 20.23 18.18 16.36 14.79 12.38 10.68 9.78 
    $100,000,000 under $250,000,000 27.57 24.15 19.59 18.68 17.63 17.82 15.91 12.99 
    $250,000,000 or more 49.61 51.67 38.34 35.13 32.41 33.04 34.39 29.73 
  No balance sheet returns 1.13 1.19 0.96 0.67 0.62 0.66 0.93 1.22 
   
Source:  IRS (2004b).   
 
 
 
 
 
